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Civil Protective Orders in Integrated Domestic Violence 
Court: An Empirical Study 
by Erika Rickard* 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
The introduction of the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”) in 
19941 led to higher arrest levels and availability of protective orders,2 
causing a significant increase in the number of domestic violence cases 
coming through the courts.  In the decades that followed, courts sought 
to accommodate this caseload through various alternatives to the tradi-
tional adversarial procedure.3  Across the country, a plethora of domes-
tic violence focus groups, pilot projects, and institutionalized courts have 
been implemented.4  
 
One approach was the development of specialized courts tailored to 
situations of domestic violence.  Domestic violence courts are considered 
“problem-solving courts,” addressing both  the legal and non-legal con-
cerns of the parties involved.5  These courts hear only domestic violence 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
* Law Clerk, Massachsetts Appeals Court, 2010-2011; Massachusetts Assistant Attorney General as of 
September 2011; J.D., Havard Law School, 2010. The  author  would like to thank Professors  Lynn 
LoPucki of UCLA School of Law and Elizabeth Warren of Harvard Law School for their guidance, 
and Parina Patel, PhD candidate at Rutgers University, for her invaluable guidance in statistical analy-
sis. 
1 Anat Maytal, Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Are They Worth the Trouble in Massachusetts?, 
18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 197, 206 (2008) (brief summary of VAWA). See also Brenda K. Uekert, Vio-
lence Against Women Act Formula Grants for State Courts, Nat’l Ctr. for St. Cts. (2003).  
2 Susan Keilitz et al., Specialization of Domestic Violence Case Management in the Courts: A National 
Survey, Nat’l Ctr. for St. Cts. 1, 1 (2000), available at 
 http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/186192.pdf. 
3 From 1989 to 1999, domestic violence filings in state courts increased by 178%. Keilitz, supra note 2, 
at 3 (citing statistics from Brian Ostrom & Neal Kauder, Examining the Work of State Courts, 1998, 
Nat’l Ctr. for St. Cts.  (1999)). Domestic violence filings include civil and criminal filings. 
4 Robyn Mazur & Liberty Aldrich, What Makes a Domestic Violence Court Work? Lessons from New 
York, 42 JUDGES' J. 5, 5-6 (2003) (describing the first court to specialize in issues related to domestic 
violence in Dade County, Florida in 1992); Pamela M. Casey & David B. Rottman, Problem-Solving 
Courts: Models and Trends, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 35, 39 (2005) (VAWA funding in 1994 led to the rapid 
proliferation of specialized courts); see also Maytal, supra note 1, at 209.  
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cases, based on criteria unique to the individual court.6  In a national sur-
vey of domestic violence courts by the National Center for State Courts, 
judges and court administrators expressed three primary reasons for es-
tablishing such courts: to “better assist victims” (83%), “increase victim 
safety” (83%), and  “improve case management” (78%).7  Faster proc-
essing of cases is implied by all three of these reasons: assisting victims 
in access to justice and more efficient case management necessarily re-
quires that courts provide court users with speedy and just resolutions. 
The New York Unified Court System developed Integrated Domestic 
Violence (“IDV”) Courts in 2001.8  In IDV Court, a single judge addresses 
all of the civil, criminal, and family matters for a single family – includ-
ing divorce  and  custody.9    IDV  Court  was designed  to  respond  to  the 
challenges that survivors10 of domestic violence experienced in the court 
systems.11    This  new  court  model  is  the  culmination  of  a  series  of 
changes in regulations, protocols, and court procedures for handling do-
mestic disputes.12 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
6 CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, BRIDGING THEORY  AND PRACTICE:  A ROUNDTABLE  ABOUT COURT RE-
SPONSES TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 4 (2006).  
7 Keilitz, supra note 2, at 12.  
8 Maytal, supra note 1, at 210. The idea for integrated courts in New York was sparked in part by 
People v.  Wood, a case in which a defendant’s criminal charges were considered double jeopardy 
because they had already been addressed in Family Court. People v.  Wood, 742 N.E.2d 114 (N.Y. 
2000). 
9  Id. 
10 The term  “victim” has been  criticized by domestic violence  advocacy organizations as  further 
stigmatizing those who experience it. However, “victim safety” is a term used frequently in literature 
related to domestic violence courts. I use both terms. 
11 Anita Womack-Weidner, Rural Integrated Domestic Violence Courts: 4th Judicial District Makes It 
Work, UCS BENCHMARKS 5 (Fall 2005). 
12 EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE (3d 
ed.  Sage  Publications  1993).  The  feminist  movement  began  to  address  rape  and  violence  against 
women, resulting in the emergence of the “battered women’s movement.” Bernadette Dunn Sewell, 
History of Abuse: Societal, Judicial, and Legislative Responses to the Problem of Wife Beating, 23 SUF-
FOLK U. L. REV. 983, 995-97 (1989). See also Maytal, supra note 1, at 202. Police protocols and prose-
cution have changed primarily as a result of lawsuits. See, e.g., Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. 
Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. l984) (holding that a woman’s equal protection was violated for inaction in re-
sponse to her complaints regarding her husband); Estate of Bailey by Oare v. York County, 768 F.2d 
503, 510 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that police have an affirmative duty to protect the personal safety of 
“women in domestic relationships”). See also Emily Sack, Domestic Violence Across State Lines: The 
Full Faith and Credit Clause, Congressional Power, and Interstate Enforcement of Protection Orders, 
98 NW. U. L. R. 827, 833 (2004) (referring to the changes in protective orders from two jurisdictions 
in 1976 to 34 jurisdictions in 1982); Jeffrey Fagan, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Nat’l Inst. of Justice, The 
Criminalization  of  Domestic  Violence:  Promises  and  Limits  7  (1996),  available  at 
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One would expect this collaboration and concerted effort on improv-
ing the justice system for victims of domestic violence would yield faster 
results than under the traditional system. The data presented here show 
the contrary: IDV Courts take longer to address motions for civil protec-
tive orders,13 and are not significantly more likely to grant such orders 
than  traditional  matrimonial courts.14   In  this context, domestic  vio-
lence survivors spend more time in IDV Court, only to receive the same 
outcomes as they would under the traditional model.  Delays in the civil 
protective order process suggest that the problem-solving court may not 
be providing  the intended benefits, indicating  the  need for  more  thor-
ough analysis before replicating the specialized court model.  
 
II.  IDV Court in Practice 
  Domestic violence can  trigger a complicated variety of different 
actions in multiple courts: criminal, civil, and family.  One domestic dis-
pute may be result in criminal assault or stalking charges, a motion for 
divorce, civil protective orders, and child custody and visitation disputes 
simultaneously.  Navigating through the court system is further compli-
cated  by  the  many  different  organizations  aimed  at  assisting  victims, 
from prosecution offices to community service providers.15  While one 
judge presides over the case, the integration of legal and social services 
means  that  there  are  more  professionals  involved  in  IDV  Court  cases 
than  traditional  cases:  social  workers,  batterer  intervention  programs, 
criminal and civil attorneys, and well as guardians ad litem or other rep-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/txtfiles/crimdom.txt (citing the first domestic violence civil protective order act in 
Pennsylvania in 1976). 
13 The phrase “protective order” carries many different connotations. I will be using it to refer to a 
class of orders that individuals take out against one another to protect their personal safety and/or as-
sets. Such orders are also referred to as protection orders, restraining orders, and injunctions. The fed-
eral government refers to them as protection orders, defined as “any injunction, restraining order, or 
any other order issued by a civil or criminal court for the purpose of preventing violent or threatening 
acts or harassment against, sexual violence, or contact or communication with or physical proximity to, 
another person, including any temporary or final order issued by a civil or criminal court whether ob-
tained by filing an independent action or as a pendente lite order in another proceeding so long as any 
civil or criminal order was issued in response to a complaint, petition, or motion filed by or on behalf of 
a person seeking protection.” 18 U.S.C. § 2266(5)(A). While “protective orders” and “protection or-
ders” are interchangeable terms, I exclusively use “protective order,” to avoid confusion with New 
York’s specific Orders of Protection. 
14 See infra pp. 8, 9. 
15 Maytal, supra note 1, at 208 (brief description of the coordination concerns between courts and 
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resentatives for children.16  Both within the courts and externally, there 
is little overlap in technology or communication between groups, poten-
tially causing victims to fall through the cracks.  New York’s IDV Courts 
are  an  attempt  to  streamline  legal  processes  for  families.    One  judge 
hears  cases  that  were  previously  handled  in  small  pieces  by  multiple 
judges.17  
 
To be eligible for IDV Court, a case must have both a criminal matter 
and either a civil or family court matter – including divorce, custody, and 
protective orders.   The IDV Court Resource Coordinator screens cases 
early in  the  process (e.g.,  pre-arraignment in  criminal  cases)  to deter-
mine whether there are other matters outstanding in other courts.18  If 
so, IDV Court staff members assess whether a case is eligible for removal 
into IDV Court, and if the (e.g., arraignment) judge agrees, he or she will 
adjourn the case to be heard in IDV Court.19  Eligibility requirements in-
clude that the parties be intimate partners (including married couples and 
dating partners), and that the criminal charge be an allegation of domes-
tic violence, most often an assault charge.20  In some courts, attorneys 
may request that a case be removed to IDV Court based on meeting these 
eligibility requirements.21  Aside from these rare occasions, the process is 
generally an administrative one, and cannot be appealed by the parties.22  
 
Once within IDV Court, all matters before the court retain their dis-
tinctions as civil, criminal, or family matters, combining the court rules 
of all three courts.23  These matters “are calendared on the same day but 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
16 Mazur, supra note 4, at 9. 
17 One Family,  One Judge:  Integrated  Domestic  Violence Courts Overview,  Office of Policy  and 
Planning, N.Y. State Courts, http://www.courts.state.ny.us/courts/problem_solving/idv/home.shtml. 
18 Melissa Labriola et al, A National Portrait of Domestic Violence Courts, Ctr. for Ct. Innovation 42 
(Dec. 2009); Domestic  Violence  Registry: Record  Retention and Disposition Schedule,  Division of 




20 Telephone Interviews with Resource Coordinator and staff, Queens County IDV Court, 11th Judi-
cial District, in Kew Gardens, N.Y. (Jan. 26, 2010). 
21 Telephone Interview with Clerk, Kings County IDV Court, 2d Judicial District, in Brooklyn, N.Y. 
(Jan. 26, 2010). 
22 Telephone Interview with administrative assistant, Domestic Violence Unit, Suffolk County District 
Attorney, in Central Islip, N.Y. (Jan. 26, 2010); Telephone Interview with Queens county IDV Re-
source Coordinator, supra note 20. 
23 See, e.g., Queens IDV Ct. Rules, N.Y. SUP. CT. 11TH JUD. DIST., available at  
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scheduled sequentially,”  allowing  the  parties  to  appear  once  to  address 
several different matters.24  Parties file motions with the IDV Clerk, and 
then await scheduling for hearings.  
 
A  civil  protection  order  is  one  of  the  remedies  available  in  IDV 
Court.  Protective orders provide a  “readily accessible remedy” to vic-
tims: instead of waiting for a criminal assault to take place, victims can 
be proactive about ensuring their own safety by asking for the abuser to 
be excluded from  the  home based on  other  abusive behaviors, such  as 
threats and verbal harassment.25  According to the State Justice Institute, 
“remedies  [available  under  a  civil  protection  order]  are  often  broader 
than criminal orders issued in conjunction with criminal proceedings and 
can  often  prohibit  conduct  that  the  police  do  not  view  as  serious.”26  
With a protective order, repeated phone calls or unwanted visits to the 
home become grounds for arrest.  
 
Either  party  can  file  a  motion  for  a  civil  protective  order  at  any 
point in divorce proceedings, including at final judgment of a matrimo-
nial action.  The judge has broad discretion in deciding whether to grant 
the order.  
 
III.  Methodology 
 
Where previous studies have focused on components of criminal do-
mestic violence cases27 such as sentencing, recidivism, and probation, the 
research  reported  here  is  limited  to  civil  protective  orders  in  divorce 
cases.28 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/courts/11jd/supreme/IDV/pubptrules.shtml.  Internal  rules  of  IDV  Court 
provide that IDV court judges have authority to hear matters in these respective areas, and that the 
IDV Court will follow their respective rules of court. 
24 Hon. Judy Harris Kluger and Liberty Aldrich, White Paper, An Argument for a One-Judge/One-
Family Approach to Domestic Violence: Lessons Based on New York’s Model, Batterer Intervention 
Services Coalition of Michigan, Fall Conference, Battle Creek, (Nov. 4, 2009), available at  
http://www.biscmi.org/jod/Plenary_3_Integrated_Domestic_Violence_Courts_whitepaper_9.10.09.pdf. 
25 Martha  Wade Steketee  et  al.,  “Implementing an  Integrated  Domestic  Violence Court: Systemic 
Change in the District of Columbia” 8 (State Just. Inst. June 2000).  
26 Id. 
27 See, e.g., Lisa Newmark et al., Specialized Felony Domestic Violence Courts: Lessons on Imple-
mentation and Impacts from the Kings County Experience vii, 37 (Urban Inst. Just. Pol’y Ctr., Oct. 
2001). 
28  I chose divorce cases because they are the clearest indication that the violence is occurring within 
the family. Civil protective orders outside of divorce may be between intimate partners or other ac-
quaintances.  RICKARD: PROTECTIVE ORDERS  03/09/11  –  5:08 PM 
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Civil  protective  orders  represent  a small focus point in  a  complex 
universe. Integrated and traditional courts alike deal with “felony domes-
tic  violence,  misdemeanor  domestic  violence,  civil  protection  orders, 
and  civil  claims.”29    Access  to  civil  orders  is  a  particularly  important 
element of victim safety.  The sooner a protective order is granted, the 
sooner the victim has access to a host of legal remedies, including greater 
response from law enforcement, and orders from the judge.30 
 
This study relies upon active cases,31 the dockets of which were ex-
tracted from the New York eCourts database, a public database available 
online.32   All cases in the study came before a judge between 2003-2009, 
from the five boroughs of New York City, as well as Long Island: Kings 
(Brooklyn), Bronx, New York, Queens, Richmond (Staten Island), Nas-
sau, and Suffolk.33   Cases are from both IDV courts and civil matrimo-
nial courts.34 
 
When analyzing motions for protective orders, I looked to see how 
long motions took and what their outcomes were by comparing the fol-
lowing information: 1) the duration of the motion, or how many days 
lapsed between  the date  the motion was filed and the date  the motion 
was  heard,35  and  2)  whether  the  motion  was  granted.36    Two  distinct 
forms of protective orders are included in this study: Orders of Protec-
tion and Orders for Exclusive Occupancy of the Residence. 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
29 Susan Keilitz et al., Tracking and Understanding Family Violence Caseloads, 5 Caseload Highlights 
1, 1 (Nat’l Ctr. for St. Cts. Apr. 1999). 
30 See Orders of Protection, infra. 
31 Only active cases are available on the database. Cold cases are not online.  
32  New York eCourts Database, http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ecourts/. 
33 There are far more cases in matrimonial courts than IDV courts. Within the selected counties, I 
included every IDV court case from 2003-2009 with a motion for an Order of Protection or for Exclu-
sive Occupancy of the Residence – twelve IDV judges. With over forty matrimonial courts in those 
jurisdictions, I selected nine matrimonial judges at random. See Appendix A, infra p. 16. 
34 Divorces are not heard in family court, but some civil judges specialize in a matrimonial docket. To 
generate comparable cases, searches were limited to divorce cases, or “matrimonial: contested” cases 
as listed in the New York eCourts database. 
35 Generally motions have a filing date and a hearing date listed. If a motion had a filing date listed but 
no hearing date, I considered it to be an open case. If the motion had been pending for over a year, I 
input the duration to be 365 days. 
36 Different court clerks use different terminology when entering data into the eCourts database. A 
motion was considered granted (or a positive outcome) if it was listed as “granted,” “ordered,” “ren-
dered,” “settled,” or if they made a reference to the details of the order (e.g., “see memo”). Motions 
were considered not granted if they were listed as “withdrawn,” “declined,” “moot,” “denied,” “ad-
journed,” or “dismissed.” If a motion was not heard for over a year after the filing date, it was consid-
ered not granted. RICKARD  03/09/11  –  5:08 PM 
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Orders of Protection37 (“OPs”), or more commonly, “restraining or-
ders,”38 can be temporary39 or permanent, and can require an individual 
to: stay away from particular people or places (e.g., children’s school, 
partner’s place of business); refrain from communicating with particular 
people;  refrain  from  already  criminal  acts  (e.g., stalking, sexual abuse, 
intimidation); injuring pets; or even refrain from specific acts “that cre-
ate  an  unreasonable  risk  to  the  health,  safety,  or  welfare”  of  specific 
family  members  (e.g., drinking alcohol).40   OPs  can  also  require indi-
viduals  to  pay  restitution  or  counsel fees,  or  participate in  “batterer’s 
education programs.”41  In order to obtain an OP, a party must success-
fully plead a “family offense” according to article 8 of the Family Court 
Act.42   Temporary orders can be granted immediately and ex parte, but 
permanent orders require a hearing. 
 
Exclusive Occupancy Orders43 (“EOs”) are a common component of 
ordinary divorce cases, where the parties have determined that one shall 
keep the marital property and the other presumably receives some other 
marital  assets.44    Pendente  lite  (“pending  the  litigation”)  orders,  how-
ever, can also be granted in cases where it is necessary  to protect one 
spouse’s safety during the course of the divorce proceedings.45  I only in-
cluded pendente lite EOs in this study. 
 
Cases in  IDV courts  and civil  matrimonial  courts do  not share  the 
general profile.  Civil matrimonial courts include all contested divorce 
cases along a spectrum  from  mild disagreement  over  alimony  to  cases 
with some intimidation or physical violence between parties.  IDV cases 
tend to be more severe: cases enter IDV Court only if there have been 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
37 N.Y. DOM. REL. L. §§240, 252. 
38  See discussion of terms for protective orders, supra note 13. 
39 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 202.7 (1986, am. 2007) for stays and temporary restraining 
orders. This study only includes permanent Orders of Protection. 
40 Form SC-1, Temporary Order of Protection, Supreme Court of New York, 9/2009; Form SC-2, Or-
der of Protection, Supreme Court of New York, 9/2009. 
41 Form SC-2, Order of Protection, supra note 40. 
42 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §812(1). See, e.g., Kristiansen v. Kristiansen, 144 A.D.2d 441 (2d Dep’t 1988); 
Fakiris v. Fakiris, 177 A.D.2d 540, 544 (2d Dep’t 1991). Parties must plead a family offense whether 
the OP is filed in Family Court or civil court.  
43 N.Y. DOM. REL. L. §§234, 236 B(5)(f).  
44  The standard for obtaining an EO is broader than that for an OP: any set of facts that would indi-
cate that “such relief is necessary to protect the safety of persons or property.” EOs meet the defini-
tion of a protection order outlined in Violence Against Women Act, 18 U.S.C. §2266(5)(A), supra note 
13. 
45 See, e.g., Scampoli v. Scampoli, 37 A.D.2d 614 (2nd Dept. 1971); King v. King, 109 A.D.2d 779, 
486 N.Y.S.2d 291 (2d Dep’t 1985); Mayeri v. Mayeri, 208 N.Y.S.2d 44 (N.Y. Sup. 1960). RICKARD: PROTECTIVE ORDERS  03/09/11  –  5:08 PM 
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criminal assault charges, meaning that physical violence is alleged in all 
of the cases.   
 
IV.  Finding 1: IDV Court Takes Longer 
 
One of the goals of IDV court is to create a streamlined, more effi-
cient process, thanks to the model of “one family, one judge.”46  Rather 
than shifting from courtroom to courtroom to handle various issues in a 
case, families meet before  the same judge for  their civil, criminal, and 
family matters.  A more streamlined process is intended to provide faster 
outcomes to families, on everything from the ultimate disposition of the 
case to hearings on Orders for Protection and Exclusive Occupancy.47  
The goal of IDV Court is to promote  “quick judicial action” to ad-
dress the time-sensitive nature of the case, according to the Center for 
Court Innovation.48  It offers judicial monitoring, coordination between 
the  court  and  outside  services,  and  a  judge  and  staff  dedicated  to  and 
trained on domestic violence issues.49  IDV Court eliminates the need for 
families to appear in multiple courts for the various pieces of the same 
dispute.50  IDV Court judges assert that the one-family, one-judge model 
increases efficiency.51   The New  York-based Center  for Court  Innova-
tion, which  promotes  the development  of  new IDV courts  throughout 
New  York  State,  claims  that  specialized  domestic  violence  courts  in-
crease victim safety and efficiency,  “streamlin[ing]  the process for all 
participants.”52  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
46 BROOK. DAILY EAGLE, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..  
47 Mazur, supra note 4, at 4.  
48 Robert V. Wolf et al., Planning a Domestic Violence Court: The New York State Experience, Ctr. 
for Ct. Innovation 5-6 (2004). 
49 Domestic Violence Courts Overview, Office of Policy and Planning, N.Y. State Courts, 
 http://www.courts.state.ny.us/courts/problem_solving/dv/home.shtml. 
50 One Family, One Judge, supra note 17. 
51 Samuel Newhouse, “One Family, One Judge,” at Brooklyn’s Integrated Domestic Violence Courts, 
BROOK. DAILY EAGLE (Apr. 8, 2009) (quoting IDV Court justices Morgenstern and Henry). I am in-
terpreting “efficiency” in this context to mean the absence of delay. 
52 Ctr. for Ct. Innovation, Integrated Domestic Violence Courts: What Are They?,  
http://www.courtinnovation.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.ViewPage&PageID=604&currentTopTier
2=true. RICKARD  03/09/11  –  5:08 PM 
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FIGURE 1: DAYS ELAPSED FROM MOTIONS FOR PROTECTIVE 
















                         t-test, p<0.001 
 
Speed was not the result.  Of the 421 observed cases, the average du-
ration of a protective order motion was longer in IDV court than in tra-
ditional civil matrimonial court from the date it was filed to the date it 
was heard before a judge.53  The mean duration in IDV Court was over a 
month longer than the mean duration in matrimonial court.  The median 
in IDV Court was twenty days longer.  
 
 
V.  Finding 2: Outcomes are the Same 
While the standard is the same for all judges issuing protective orders, 
the IDV Court makeup is a different subset of cases. Cases that come be-
fore the IDV Court tend to be more severe, and come with greater atten-
tion to  the safety concerns for both parties.  Because of the increased 
severity  of  IDV  cases  and  the  policy  focus  in  IDV  Court  on  victim 
safety, the IDV Court seems more likely to yield a higher number of mo-
tions granted than the traditional matrimonial court.  Given the criminal 
matters associated with IDV cases, these motions tend to reflect higher 




53 T-test, p<0.01. RICKARD: PROTECTIVE ORDERS  03/09/11  –  5:08 PM 
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This was not the case.  Of the 454 remaining motions with a clear 
outcome, nearly as many motions for protective orders were granted in 
traditional courts.54 
TABLE 1: MOTIONS  FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER GRANTED,            
BY COURT 
Court  Granted  Total  % Granted 
Matrimonial  162  366  44% 
IDV  42  88  48% 
 Pearson χ-square, p=0.557 
 
The difference between matrimonial and IDV courts was not statisti-
cally  significant.    A  party  seeking  a  protective  order  had  the  same 
chance of a positive result in either court.  
 
Each  IDV  Court  in  the  state was initiated  individually,  through  its 
own grant application process to the federal Office of Violence Against 
Women (OVW) and facilitated by the statewide Unified Court System.55  
As a result, the primary focus has historically been on violence against 
women.  When breaking down  the protective order motions by gender, 
however,  there was no significant difference in percentage of  motions 
granted to wives against their husbands.56  
TABLE 2: WIFE-INITIATED MOTIONS FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER 
GRANTED, BY COURT 
Court  Granted  Total  % Granted 
Matrimonial  117  258  55% 
IDV  30  58  48% 
Pearson χ-square, p=0.379 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
54 In 98 of the observed cases, there was no discernible outcome on the motion for a protective order. 
The clerks of two IDV court judges, Judges Ayres and Crecca, used the term “motion decided” to in-
dicate the disposition for most motions. Given that “decided” does not clearly indicate whether it was 
decided favorably or not, all cases with the disposition “decided” were only considered for their data 
on motion duration. 
55 Telephone Interview with Pamela Kravetz, Grants/Contracts Manager, Division of Grants and Pro-
gram Development, New York State Unified Courts System, in New York, N.Y. (Dec. 14, 2009). 
56 New York does not grant same-sex marriages, but does recognize out-of-state same-sex marriages. 
No same-sex dissolutions were observed in this study.  RICKARD  03/09/11  –  5:08 PM 
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 These data suggest that, contrary to all the intentions of those who 
constructed these courts, high-risk cases are not receiving a higher level 
of scrutiny or focus on victim safety.  
 
Variation by Judge57 
Although motions do not vary significantly by court, there is a high 
degree of variation by judge.  Judges in the study granted anywhere from 
8  to  100%  of  protective  order  motions  in  IDV  Court,  and  anywhere 
from 15 to 53% in matrimonial court.58  
 

























                   Pearson χ-square, p<0.00159 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
57  See Appendix B, infra p. 17. 
58 Some of the IDV courts in the study had very small sample sizes, making the data seem more ex-
treme, but judges with fewer than 5 cases with outcomes were removed: Farneti = 3, Harrington = 3, 
Kiesel = 1. 
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Differences  remain in  the way  that domestic  violence is  treated in 
the courts.  However, these differences are between matrimonial and IDV 
courts, but rather, between and among judges.60  In any one case, regard-
less of its own merits, a party seeking a restraining order has a greater 
likelihood of receiving one in Judge Silber’s court than in Judge Jackson-
Stack’s court, for example.  
 
Some  systematic  variation  is  expected  in  any  courtroom  setting.61  
Judges tend to approach the bench with consistent styles, and base opin-
ions on their own well-formed ideas of unique cases. However, IDV Court 
aims  to  promote  greater  consistency  across  courts, which  would  limit 
variation between judges. In the words of the IDV Court’s Administrative 
Judge,  “IDV  Courts  aim  to  provide  more  informed  judicial  decision-
making  and  greater  consistency  in  court  orders.”62  In  fact,  variation 




VI.  Discussion 
 
Explanations for the Data  
Why  do  IDV  courts  take  longer  in  assessing  protective  order  mo-
tions?  Surely it is not because court staff and judges recognize the im-
portance of these motions any less than their Supreme Court counter-
parts.  According to anecdotal evidence, it seems that temporary orders 
are equally accessible across courts – it is the formal decision of a per-
manent order where the disparity is most clear.64 
One  possibility  is  that  in  the  holistic  IDV  model,  judges  prioritize 
matters within a case differently, e.g., addressing criminal charges first, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
60 Pearson χ-square, p<0.001. 
61 See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, The ‘Hidden Judiciary’: An Empirical Analysis of Executive Branch Jus-
tice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477, 1500 et seq. (2009) (describing anchoring bias and other bias in decision-
making for judges, Administrative Law Judges, and college students). 
62 Id. See also Mandy Burton, Judicial Monitoring of Compliance: Introducing ‘Problem-Solving’ Ap-
proaches to Domestic Violence Courts in England and Wales, 20 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 366, 368 
(2006) (discussing the benefit of preventing inconsistent orders). Conflicting court orders or redundant 
court orders has come up time and again. See, e.g., Carolyn D. Schwarz, United Family Courts: A Sav-
ing Grace for Victims of Domestic Violence Living in Nations With Fragmented Court Systems, 42 FAM. 
CT. REV. 304, 311-12 (Apr. 2004).  
63 This is consistent with observations of an integrated court in Washington, D.C. See Steketee, supra 
note 25, at 67.  
64  Interview with Erie County Family Court Judge, in Cambridge, Mass. (Mar. 29, 2010). RICKARD  03/09/11  –  5:08 PM 
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then the custody of the children, before ruling on protective orders. Ad-
dressing three different matters within one court appearance poses a sig-
nificant administrative burden on the individual Court. 
 
Compounding that burden is the large number of advocates, legal and 
non-legal, that must come together at the same time for a given appear-
ance.  It may be simply more difficult for all the necessary participants 
to schedule an appearance at all in IDV court, meaning that parties must 
wait longer before addressing their motions.  
 
IDV courts that take longer than traditional courts in processing civil 
protective orders do not meet the goals of efficiency or victim safety.65 
As stated by the Center for Court Innovation, “[t]he longer the victim 
must wait for legal action, the longer she is at risk.”66   
 
Re-thinking IDV Court 
The delays in  the civil protection  order process do not  necessarily 
imply  that  the  specialized  court  model  should be abandoned.    Rather, 
these results indicate the need for a closer eye on the results of court in-
novations, and a firmer foundation for why such innovations are imple-
mented.  For example, while IDV Court proponents claim  that  having 
one judge creates efficiency, efficiency is clearly not the reason there are 
social  services staff  present  at  hearings  –  insofar  as  efficiency  means 
speedy acquisition of necessary protective orders (and speedy denial of 
unnecessary motions).  Other goals of the Court include victim satisfac-
tion with the process as well as increased defendant accountability.67  Al-
though advocates in the courtroom may have the potential to slow down 
hearings, they may be working with both parties to ensure satisfaction 
and accountability beyond the courtroom.68  Increased attention to both 
parties in the case by legal and social services may also be reducing re-
cidivism, which  achieves  the goal  of  victim safety  on  a  much broader 
level.69 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
65 Keilitz, supra note 2; Mazur, supra note 4, at 4. 
66 Mazur, supra note 4, at 4.  
67 Burton, supra note 62, at 368-369. 
68 CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION ROUNDTABLE, supra note 6, at 4 (citing several studies from 1999-2002, 
referring to criminal DV courts only). Victim satisfaction does not necessarily correlate to improved 
outcomes, as “the court experience itself is only a small percentage of the complainant’s total experi-
ence with the case.”  
69 E.g., Adele Harrell et al., The Evaluation of Milwaukee’s Judicial Oversight Demonstration, Urban 
Institute Just. Pol’y Ctr. 11 (Apr. 2006).; Elena Salzman, The Quincy District Court Domestic Violence 
Prevention Program: A Model Legal Framework for Domestic Violence Intervention, 74 B.U. L. REV. 
329, 344 n.83 (1994). Suprisingly, reducing recidivism was not listed as a top priority for the Court. 
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While these are all possible benefits to the IDV model, policy-makers 
in New  York have yet  to determine whether IDV Court is successfully 
achieving these results in those arenas. Although there have been evalua-
tions  of  victim satisfaction in domestic  violence courts generally,  the 
New York IDV Court has not engaged in any such analysis, nor has there 
been review of recidivism or other factors.70  Individual performance re-
view is necessary to determine what is actually working for this court, as 
other specialized courts throughout the country have yielded mixed re-
sults.71 
 
The  available data suggest  that  the  IDV Court  model does not im-
prove efficiency and victim safety in the realm of civil protective or-
ders.   
 
VII.  Conclusion 
Policy-makers see the rapid expansion of specialized courts as proof 
that the model is a successful one.72  IDV Courts are replicating without 
assessment of the impact they are having on families.73  While the im-
pact  of  victim  advocates  and defendant  accountability  measures is un-
known, the available measurement of the Court indicates that the Court 
is not fully achieving its mission of a faster and more consistent system. 
 
Civil protective orders take longer to process in IDV Court, but are 
not more likely to be granted.  Civil protective orders form one small 
piece of domestic violence cases, but a crucial one.  Protective orders are 
designed  to increase  victim safety,  and  they  require  efficiency in  case 
process in order to function properly.  So long as the goals of the Court 
include victim safety and efficiency, they demand prompt and consistent 
resolution of protective orders.  The current procedure of long waits for 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Keilitz, supra note 2, at 12. Increasing victim safety and reducing recidivism may be correlated, but 
the specific goal of reducing recidivism was not widely discussed by survey participants. 
70 Keilitz, supra note 2, at 9.  
71  Milwaukee,  Wisconsin’s  criminal domestic violence  court  and the  Quincy,  Massachusetts inte-
grated civil-criminal domestic violence court both reviewed their overall performance. Victim satis-
faction with the court did not increase in Quincy, and decreased in Milwaukee, compared to non-
specialized courts. Robert C. Davis et al., Increasing Convictions in Domestic Violence Cases: A Field 
Test in Milwaukee, 22 JUST. SYS. J. 61, 68 (2001); Eve Buzawa et al, Response to Domestic Violence in 
a Pro-Active Court Setting, Nat’l Crim. Just. Reference Svcs. 15 (Mar. 1999). 
72 Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye, State of the Judiciary Address (Jan. 2001), in State of the Judiciary Ad-
dress, New York, N.Y (2001), at 6. 
73    IDV  Courts  have  expanded  from  two  in  2001  to twenty-eight  in  2005  to  forty-four  in  2009. 
Womack-Weidner, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 5; One Family, One Judge, supra 
note 17. RICKARD  03/09/11  –  5:08 PM 
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orders, combined with judge-specific differences in case outcomes, is in-
adequate to its mission.  Good intentions alone are insufficient to design 
an effective court system. As this study indicates, court design and im-
plementation demands more concrete goals, with thorough review to en-
sure  that  those  goals  are  being  achieved.  For  example,  it  is  unclear  
whether other elements of the program are more successful.  Do victims 
of domestic violence who access the court report higher degrees of satis-
faction  with  their  experience  than  those  in  traditional  matrimonial 
court?  Do families who use the social services provided by IDV Court 
have lower rates of recidivism than under the traditional legal system?  
These questions warrant careful consideration before the integrated court 
model expands. RICKARD: PROTECTIVE ORDERS  03/09/11  –  5:08 PM 
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APPENDIX A:  CASES, BY JUDGE 
 
Judge  Frequency  Percent 
Adams (Kings)  64  12 
Barros (Kings)  23  4 
Fitzmaurice (Queens)  53  10 
Globerman (Bronx)  37  7 
Jackson-Stack (Nassau)  82  15 
Martin (Bronx)  15  3 
Panepinto (Richmond)  52  10 
Strauss (Queens)  41  8 
Thomas (Kings)  35  6 
Matrimonial  402  74 
 
Ayres (Nassau)  6  1 
Camacho (Queens)  5  1 
Crecca (Suffolk)  41  8 
Dawson (NY)  5  1 
DiDomenico (Richmond)  10  2 
Farneti (Suffolk)  20  4 
Harrington (Queens)  3  1 
Henry (Kings)  8  1 
Kiesel (Bronx)  1  0.2 
Morgenstern (Kings)  22  4 
Sher (Nassau)  9  2 
Silber (Richmond)  13  2 
IDV  143  26 
 
Total  545  100 
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APPENDIX B:  MOTIONS GRANTED, BY JUDGE 
 
Judge  Granted  Total  % Granted 
 
Matrimonial 
Adams (Kings)  32  64  50 
Barros (Kings)  12  23  52 
Fitzmaurice (Queens)  28  53  53 
Globerman (Bronx)  13  37  35 
Jackson-Stack (Nassau)  7  47  15 
Martin (Bronx)  7  15  47 
Panepinto (Richmond)  34  52  65 
Strauss (Queens)  10  41  24 
Thomas (Kings)  19  35  54 
 




+ In 98 of the 545 cases in this study, the outcomes of civil protective order motions were unclear. See 
explanation, supra note 54.  
Camacho (Queens)  2  5  40 
Crecca (Suffolk)  1  12  8 
Dawson (NY)  5  5  100 
DiDomenico (Richmond)  5  10  50 
Henry (Kings)  5  8  63 
Morgenstern (Kings)  12  22  55 
Sher (Nassau)  1  5  20 
Silber (Richmond)  10  13  77 
Total  203  447+  45 